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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 06-1544
________________
FRED WAGNER,
Appellant
v.
TUSCARORA SCHOOL DIST; BOARD OF SCHOOL DIRECTORS OF THE
TUSCARORA SCHOOL DISTRICT; ROBERT BEAUMONT; THOMAS
STAPLEFORD; JANE RICE; *JEFFREY SPIDEL; DARLA THARP; KEITH
SMITH; MICHAEL RICE

*PER CLERK'S ORDER 5/1/06
___________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 04-cv-01133)
District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
March 8, 2007
Before: SLOVITER, MCKEE AND AMBRO, CIRCUIT JUDGES

(Filed March 14, 2007 )
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________

PER CURIAM
Fred Wagner appeals pro se from the orders of the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Pennsylvania granting summary judgment and granting partial
dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
The factual and procedural history of this case need not be discussed at length
here; it is well-known to the parties, and is set forth in the District Court’s opinion
granting summary judgment. Wagner filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which
was amended twice, alleging that the defendants denied him notice and an opportunity to
be heard before his termination from employment as band teacher and director for the
Tuscarora School District (“District”), in violation of his substantive and procedural due
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Wagner claimed that his summary
termination and the publicity surrounding it deprived him of his property right to his job
and his liberty interest in his reputation. The Second Amended Complaint also included
state law claims of civil conspiracy, defamation, tortious interference with contractual
relations, breach of contract, and violation of Pennsylvania’s Wage Payment and
Collection Act (“WPCA”). Wagner sought a transfer and/or promotion, lost wages, and
damages.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), to which Wagner responded. The District Court dismissed Wagner’s
substantive due process and WPCA claims as to all defendants, his procedural due
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process claim as to all defendants except Superintendent Stapleford, and his defamation
claim except as to defendants Stapleford and Beaumont (Principal of James Buchanan
High School).1 The defendants answered the remaining claims in the Second Amended
Complaint and, once discovery was completed, both the defendants and Wagner moved
for summary judgment. After reviewing the written materials, including the parties’
respective statements of undisputed facts, the District Court denied Wagner’s motion for
summary judgment and granted the defendants’ summary judgment motion as to all
outstanding claims.
The District Court determined that the District did not suspend Wagner without
due process when they placed him on administrative leave without pay pending a State
Police investigation pursuant to an agreement that Wagner proposed and the District
accepted.2 The District Court also held that the August 12 meeting, at which Stapleford
informed Wagner generally of the charges against him and offered Wagner a choice of
resignation or suspension and termination proceedings, was sufficient to meet procedural
due process standards for a pre-suspension hearing. The District Court rejected Wagner’s

1

In his pro se informal brief, Wagner generally refers to the dismissal of all claims
but does not raise any specific issue with respect to the claims dismissed under Rule
12(b)(6). To the extent that he appeals the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, we conclude that the
dismissal was proper for the reasons set forth in the District Court’s Memorandum
Opinion entered September 22, 2005. See Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare
Fund v. Phillip Morris Inc., et al., 171 F.3d 912, 919 (3d Cir. 1999) (standard of review).
2

The State Police investigation into alleged sexual harassment and other conduct
did not result in criminal charges.
3

contention that he was terminated at the August 12 meeting, holding that the August 12
meeting was not a “de facto termination hearing” requiring due process protections. The
District Court ruled that the District gave Wagner all of the process that he was due under
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985), when it informed him of the
charges against him in writing and gave him an opportunity to respond to the District’s
notice of his right to request a hearing in June 2004. The District Court noted that it was
only after Wagner failed to request a hearing that he was terminated in August 2004. As
for Wagner’s claim that the defendants deprived him of a liberty interest in his reputation
without due process, the District Court held that Wagner was given the opportunity to
have a “name-clearing hearing” when the District gave him the statement of charges
against him and notice of his right to a hearing in accordance with Loudermill.
As for the state law claims, the District Court held that Wagner failed to show that
the defendants conspired to report false allegations of sexual harassment because there
was no record evidence that the allegations were false. The District Court rejected
Wagner’s claim that Stapleford and Beaumont defamed him by publishing false
information about the sexual harassment allegations because there was no record
evidence showing that the defendants were responsible for making public the news of
Wagner’s suspension and the District’s investigation. The District Court determined that
Stapleford discussed the circumstances surrounding Wagner’s suspension with parents
(one of whom happened to be married to a newspaper reporter) of Wagner’s students and
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gave comments to a reporter who contacted him to confirm information about the matter.
The District Court held that Wagner’s tortious interference claim failed because all of the
defendants were parties to the collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) and, therefore,
they were not “third parties” interfering with that contract. The District Court granted
summary judgment on the breach of contract claim because Wagner failed to pursue the
grievance procedure provided under the CBA for resolving contract disputes and because
there was no record evidence that the defendants’ conduct rendered the CBA null and
void. Wagner timely appealed.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review
over the District Court’s orders granting summary judgment. See Pub. Interest Research
Group of N.J., Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64 76 (3d Cir. 1990).
Summary judgment shall be granted when “no genuine issue [exists] as to any material
fact and [when] the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c). We view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and
we draw all inferences in that party’s favor. See Reitz v. County of Bucks, 125 F.3d 139,
143 (3d Cir. 1997). The “nonmoving party cannot rely upon conclusory allegations in its
pleadings or in memoranda and briefs to establish a genuine issue of material fact.”
Pastore v. Bell Telephone Co. of Pa., 24 F.3d 508, 511-12 (3d Cir. 1994). Rather, the
nonmoving party “must make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of every
element essential to his case, based on the affidavits or by the depositions and admissions
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on file.” Harter v. GAF Corp., 967 F.2d 846, 852 (3d Cir. 1992). We will affirm for
substantially the same reasons set forth by the District Court in its opinion. With respect
to the state law civil conspiracy claim, we add only that there is no record evidence of an
agreement or understanding among or between any of the defendants to violate Wagner’s
civil rights or to defame him.
Wagner argues on appeal that there is a genuine dispute of material fact with
respect to the August 12 meeting. Wagner says that it was a de facto termination hearing.
We disagree. As the District Court correctly concluded, the record evidence indicates that
Wagner was not terminated until August 2004, after the District gave him a formal
statement of charges and notified him of his right to have a hearing at which he could
present his own witnesses and confront his accusers. Based on the contents of Wagner’s
letter requesting unpaid leave and the substance of the secretarial notes of the August 12
meeting (the accuracy of which Wagner does not dispute, see Plaintiff’s Statement of
Undisputed Facts at ¶ 11), reasonable jurors could conclude that Wagner was not
terminated on August 12, 2003. Contrary to Wagner’s assertions, Stapleford’s testimony
that he told Wagner to resign or be terminated does not conflict materially with the other
record evidence. According to the secretarial notes of the meeting, Stapleford proposed
resignation in lieu of termination proceedings. If Wagner chose not to resign, the District
would place him on unpaid administrative leave and proceed with his dismissal at some
point in the beginning of the new school year. In any event, as Wagner admitted in his

6

statement of facts, Stapleford could not effectively terminate Wagner’s employment at the
August 12 meeting because he had no authority to do so. In the absence of any competent
evidence indicating that Wagner was summarily terminated on August 12, the District
Court properly held that the due process claims with respect to the August 12 meeting
lacked merit.
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

